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I. INTRODUCTION
During the last Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court issued USAA
Texas Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, which was a significant opinion addressing
extra-contractual claims against insurers under Chapter 541 of the Texas
Insurance Code.1 The supreme court set forth five rules applicable to
claims brought under Chapter 541.2 During this Survey period, several
opinions were issued by Texas appellate and federal courts applying the
Menchaca rules. Below the authors discuss several examples showing how
courts have applied these rules. Also of significance are several cases in-
volving application of the “eight-corners” rule in determining the duty to
defend, and whether or to what extent exceptions to the eight-corners
rule should apply.
II. DUTY TO DEFEND
Whether an insurer is obligated to provide a defense to its insured is a
question of law to be decided by the courts.3 In Texas, the insurer’s duty
to defend is determined based on a review of the four corners of the
1. USAA Tex. Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d 479, 484 (Tex. 2018).
2. Id.
3. See Myers v. Hall Columbus Lender, LLC, 437 S.W.3d 632, 637–38 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2014, no pet.) (citing Pine Oak Builders, Inc. v. Great Am. Lloyds Ins. Co., 279
S.W.3d 650, 655 (Tex. 2009)).
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insurance policy and the four corners of the pleading against the insured.4
Generally, only these “eight corners” of these two documents are rele-
vant to the determination of the insurer’s obligation to defend its in-
sured.5 While this rule is relatively simple, its simplicity can present
challenges for courts when applying the eight-corners rule. A strict appli-
cation of the rule in some circumstances could yield a result inconsistent
with the intent of the parties to the insurance contract. Also, application
of this simple rule can be difficult when allegations in the pleading lack
sufficient specificity to determine whether the claim falls within the cov-
erage afforded by the policy. As a result, Texas courts have struggled with
whether the eight-corners rule should be subject to any exceptions. While
the Texas Supreme Court has never officially recognized that an extrinsic-
evidence exception exists,6 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
has recognized that a narrow exception exists.7 Accordingly, until the
Texas Supreme Court squarely addresses this issue, there will remain un-
certainty among Texas state courts as to whether, or to what extent, any
exception exists that would permit a court to look to extrinsic evidence to
resolve the question of an insurer’s duty to defend.
A. FEDERAL COURT RELIES ON EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE ABOUT DATES
OF CONSTRUCTION IN CONCLUDING THAT DUTY TO DEFEND
IS PRECLUDED BY A “PRIOR INJURY OR
DAMAGE EXCLUSION”
In Evanston Insurance Co. v. Kinsale Insurance Co., the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Texas determined that reliance on ex-
trinsic evidence as to the date “property damage” occurred was permissi-
ble because the pleading was silent as to the date of any property damage
and the date of property damage was determinative as to coverage under
the applicable policy.8 In the underlying lawsuit, a general contractor
sued a school district for non-payment, prompting the school district to
file counterclaims against the contractor for defective construction work
by it and its subcontractors. The contractor then asserted claims against
its subcontractors, alleging property damage due to defective work.9 One
of the subcontractors was insured under commercial general liability in-
surance policies issued by both Evanston Insurance Company (Evanston)
and Kinsale Insurance Company (Kinsale), covering different policy
4. GuideOne Elite Ins. Co. v. Fielder Rd. Baptist Church, 197 S.W.3d 305, 308 (Tex.
2006) (citing King v. Dallas Fire Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 185, 187 (Tex. 2002)).
5. See Pine Oak, 279 S.W.3d at 655.
6. See GuideOne Elite, 197 S.W.3d at 308 (“[T]his Court has never expressly recog-
nized an exception to the eight-corners rule . . . .”).
7. See Ooida Risk Retention Grp., Inc. v. Williams, 579 F.3d 469, 476 (5th Cir. 2009);
see also Star-Tex Res., LLC v. Granite State Ins. Co., 553 F. App’x 366, 371 (5th Cir. 2014)
(per curiam) (“We conclude that there is a limited exception to the eight-corners rule that,
under the circumstances of this appeal, allows us to consider extrinsic evidence.”).
8. Evanston Ins. Co. v. Kinsale Ins. Co., No. 7:17-CV-327, 2018 WL 4103031, at *11
(S.D. Tex. Jul. 12, 2018).
9. Id. at *1.
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periods.10
Kinsale’s policies included a “Prior Injury or Damage Exclusion” pro-
vision that barred coverage for damage “which begins or takes place
before the inception date of [the] policy. . . .”11 Although both insurers
initially provided a defense to the subcontractor, Kinsale subsequently
denied coverage and withdrew its defense, contending that it did not owe
a duty to defend because the property damage first began prior to the
inception of its policies. Evanston challenged Kinsale’s position and filed
a declaratory judgment action in federal court.12
Kinsale’s policies provided coverage for the policy period beginning
August 6, 2013, and ending August 6, 2014.13 The underlying lawsuit was
filed on March 18, 2016. The school district’s counterclaim against the
general contractor specifically alleged that construction for one project
began on April 26, 2011, and continued through September 24, 2012, and
that construction on the other project began on May 19, 2009, and contin-
ued through March 9, 2011.14 However, the general contractor’s claim
against the subcontractor insured by Kinsale was silent as to the dates of
any alleged property damage.15 Despite the absence of any allegations
regarding the dates of property damage in the pleading against the sub-
contractor, Kinsale nevertheless concluded that evidence of damage be-
ginning prior to the inception of its policy precluded a duty to defend
based on its “Prior Injury or Damage Exclusion” clause.
Because the claim by the general contractor against Kinsale’s insured
was silent as to when the alleged property damage occurred,16 Kinsale
urged the district court to consider the allegations in the underlying coun-
terclaim by the school district against the general contractor.17 Con-
versely, Evanston argued that Kinsale had a duty to defend because the
allegations in the pleading against the insured subcontractor did “not spe-
cifically rule out the possibility of a [potentially covered] claim . . . .”18
The district court noted that, under Evanston’s reasoning, the fact that a
pleading “does not specifically rule out the possibility of a claim then that
means there is a potential claim.”19 In rejecting this reasoning, the district
court explained that “[w]hile a potential claim gives rise to a duty to de-
fend, courts may not ‘read facts into the pleadings,’ and ‘[a] duty to de-
fend should not be allowed to spring into existence based on artful or
inartful pleading.’”20 The district court concluded that accepting Evans-
10. Id. at *1–2.
11. Id. at *2.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at *1.
15. Id.
16. Id. at *10.
17. Id. at *9.
18. Id. at *10.
19. Id.
20. Id. (citing Weingarten Realty Mgmt. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 343 S.W.3d
859, 869 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied)).
2019] Insurance Law 185
ton’s argument “would undermine the Court’s driving aim which is to
give effect to the intention in the underlying insurance policy.”21 The dis-
trict court found that Evanston had not met its burden to “plead and
prove” that there was coverage under the Kinsale policies that would trig-
ger its duty to defend.
The district court justified its reliance on the school district’s pleading
against the general contractor (which was evidence extrinsic to the eight
corners of the insurance policy and pleading against the subcontractor)
because that document provided the “relevant factual background” of the
claims at issue in the lawsuit, which was necessary to understand whether
those claims would implicate coverage for the subcontractor.22 This was a
circumstance that warranted application of an extrinsic-evidence excep-
tion, as “[t]he alleged date of construction goes solely to a fundamental
issue of coverage and does not implicate the merits or depend on the
truth of the facts alleged.”23 Based on the allegations in the counterclaim,
the district court determined that Kinsale did not owe a duty to defend its
insured.24
This case is illustrative of the fact that federal courts have embraced
exceptions to the eight-corners rule in certain circumstances, while Texas
state appellate courts appear to still be reluctant to recognize the exis-
tence of any exceptions to the rule. For example, in Gehan Homes, Ltd. v.
Employers Mutual Casualty Co. and Summit Custom Homes, Inc. v. Great
American Lloyds Insurance Co., the Dallas Court of Appeals held that if
a pleading is silent as to the date of loss, the insurer is obligated to defend
unless other bases exist to deny coverage.25 In Gehan, the court specifi-
cally noted that it could not “look outside the pleadings to determine
when the injury manifested itself” in determining whether coverage was
potentially triggered under an insuring agreement.26 By contrast, the fed-
eral court in Evanston relied on extrinsic evidence in determining
whether the exclusion in Kinsale’s policy relieved Kinsale of a duty to
defend in order to “give effect to the intention in the underlying insur-
ance policy.”27
B. STATE COURT DECLINES TO CONSIDER EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE
THAT A VEHICLE WAS OPERATED BY AN EXCLUDED
DRIVER IN EVALUATING THE DUTY TO DEFEND
In Avalos v. Loya Insurance Co., the San Antonio Court of Appeals
evaluated whether deposition testimony of an insured that directly con-




25. Gehan Homes, Ltd. v. Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co., 146 S.W.3d 833, 845 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2004, pet. denied); Summit Custom Homes, Inc. v. Great Am. Lloyds Ins. Co., 202
S.W.3d 823, 828 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. withdrawn).
26. Gehan Homes, Ltd., 146 S.W.3d at 845–46.
27. Evanston Ins. Co., 2018 WL 4103031, at *11.
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tradicted the allegations in the pleading was relevant to the duty-to-de-
fend analysis.28 Significantly, the insured’s deposition testimony directly
contradicted the specific allegations in the pleading in the liability lawsuit
as to the identity of the driver of the vehicle at issue.29
Karla Flores Guevara (Guevara) was insured under an auto policy is-
sued by Loya Insurance Company (Loya). Guevara was the only named
insured on the policy. The policy included a named driver exclusion iden-
tifying Guevara’s husband, Rodolfo Flores, as an excluded driver. A colli-
sion occurred between an automobile operated by Flores and an
automobile occupied by Osbaldo Hurtado Avalos and Antonio Hurtado
(the Hurtados). Although Flores was the driver at fault, Guevara, Flores,
and the Hurtados reported to the police and Loya after the accident that
Guevara, rather than Flores, was driving the vehicle that collided with the
Hurtados.30
The Hurtados sued Guevara, alleging that her negligence caused the
accident. Loya appointed defense counsel to defend Guevara. Guevara
identified herself as the driver during initial stages of discovery. However,
Loya thereafter discovered that Flores was actually driving the vehicle at
the time of the accident and subsequently denied coverage and withdrew
from defending Guevara. A judgment was ultimately rendered against
Guevara. The Hurtados, as assignees of Guevara, then filed suit against
Loya and alleged that Loya breached its duty to defend Guevara.31 Loya
counterclaimed for breach of contract, fraud, and a declaration that it had
no duty to defend Guevara because of the policy’s named driver exclu-
sion. Loya moved for summary judgment and, in support of its motion,
provided Guevara’s deposition testimony in the coverage lawsuit against
Loya in which Guevara admitted that Flores was driving the car at the
time of the accident.32 The trial court granted Loya’s motion for summary
judgment.
On appeal, the Hurtados contended that summary judgment was im-
proper because the trial court failed to evaluate Loya’s duty to defend
pursuant to the eight-corners rule.33 In response, Loya argued that refer-
ence to the deposition testimony established that Guevara materially
breached the policy by falsely reporting that she was the driver. As such,
this precluded a duty to defend. The court rejected this argument, ex-
plaining that under the general eight-corners rule, the only documents
relevant to the determination of the duty to defend are the insurance
policy and the pleadings.34 Moreover, facts that contradict the pleading or
that are discovered during the course of litigation do not affect the duty
28. Avalos v. Loya Ins. Co., No. 04-17-00070-CV, 2018 WL 3551260, at *5 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio Jul. 25, 2018, pet. filed) (mem. op.).
29. Id. at *2.
30. Id. at *1.
31. Id.
32. Id. at *2.
33. Id.
34. Id. at *4.
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to defend.35 Similarly, facts that overlap with liability issues are generally
not considered. Because the Hurtados’ petition contained no allegations
that Flores was the negligent driver of the vehicle, the court found that
this was not a situation where evaluation of the deposition testimony to
determine the duty to defend was proper.36 Rather, the court found that
the deposition testimony contradicted the allegations in the pleading and
overlapped with the liability issues.37 Moreover, the court found that if
Loya knew that the allegations in the pleading were untrue, it had a duty
to establish such facts in defense of its insured, as that is a valuable bar-
gained-for benefit of the insurance policy.38
Interestingly, one justice issued a concurring opinion where she
pointed out that while the Texas Supreme Court has never recognized an
exception to the eight-corners rule, “it indicated that an exception may be
appropriate where collusion or fraud exists.”39 In noting that the sum-
mary judgment evidence established fraud and collusion between the
Hurtados, Guevara, and Flores, the concurring justice opined that this
should be a situation where extrinsic evidence should be allowed to deter-
mine the duty to defend.40 However, she concurred in the judgment
“[b]ecause the supreme court has not yet recognized an exception to the
eight-corners rule.”41
Because the pleading against Guevara specifically alleged that Guevara
was driving the vehicle, it appears that the court of appeals correctly ap-
plied the eight-corners rule. However, this is an example of when a strict
application of the rule can “bind insurance companies to defend claims
that are clearly outside of the bounds of their policy.”42 In Evanston, dis-
cussed above, the court noted that such a rule undermines the driving aim
of giving effect to the intention of the policy.43 Moreover, in Avalos, the
strict application of the eight corners-rule appears to have allowed the
plaintiffs and the insured to impose an obligation on the insurer through
a deliberate misrepresentation of the actual facts in the underlying plead-
ing. Such an inequitable result could be avoided by a reasonable excep-
tion to the eight-corners rule.
35. Id. (citing Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Nokia, Inc., 268 S.W.3d 487, 491 (Tex. 2008)).
36. Id. at *5.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at *6 (Angelini, J., concurring).
40. See id. at *6–7.
41. Id. at *7.
42. Evanston Ins. Co. v. Kinsale Ins. Co., No. 7:17-CV-327, 2018 WL 4103031, at *11
(S.D. Tex. Jul. 12, 2018) (emphasis added).
43. Id.
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C. FIFTH CIRCUIT HOLDS DUTY TO DEFEND OWED TO AN
ADDITIONAL INSURED BASED ON INFERENCES DRAWN
FROM PLEADING AND POLICY
In Lyda Swinerton Builders, Inc. v. Oklahoma Surety Co., the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit evaluated whether a general con-
tractor was entitled to defense as an additional insured under a commer-
cial general liability policy.44 Lyda Swinerton Builders, Inc. (Lyda), the
general contractor, hired subcontractor Willis Company, Inc. (Willis) to
assist in the construction of an office building. The subcontract agreement
between Lyda and Willis required Willis to maintain a general liability
insurance policy designating Lyda as an additional insured.45
In the underlying lawsuit, the plaintiff asserted claims against Lyda for
breach of contract due to alleged delays in construction and material defi-
ciencies.46 The plaintiff alleged that Lyda was responsible for numerous
construction defects, including deficiencies in “the roof” and structures
on or near the roof. However, in its original petition, the plaintiff did not
name Willis as a defendant, did not include any allegations that Willis was
responsible for any of the construction defects, and did not identify Willis
as the roofing contractor.47
Oklahoma Surety Company (Oklahoma Surety) issued Willis a com-
mercial general liability insurance policy identifying Willis as a “COM-
MERCIAL ROOFING CONTRACTOR.”48 The policy included an
endorsement naming Lyda as an additional insured, “but only with re-
spect to liability directly attributable to [Willis’] performance of ‘[Willis’]
work’ for [Lyda].”49 Moreover, coverage for Lyda applied only if Willis
had agreed in a “written ‘insured contract’ to designate [Lyda] as an addi-
tional insured.”50 The policy defined “insured contract” to include
“‘[t]hat part of any other contract or agreement pertaining to [Willis’]
business . . . under which [Willis] assume[s] the tort liability of another
party . . . .’”51 Lyda requested a defense and an indemnity from
Oklahoma Surety as an “additional insured” under the policy issued to
Willis. Oklahoma Surety denied that request.52
1. The “Written Insured Contract” Requirement
The first part of the Fifth Circuit’s additional-insured analysis was
whether Willis had agreed in a “written ‘insured contract’” to name Lyda
as an additional insured.53 Oklahoma Surety made two arguments that
44. Lyda Swinerton Builders, Inc. v. Okla. Sur. Co., 903 F.3d 435, 445 (5th Cir. 2018).
45. Id. at 440.
46. Id. at 442.
47. Id. at 442–43.
48. Id. at 441.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 441–42.
52. Id. at 443.
53. Id. at 445.
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this “written ‘insured contract’” requirement was not met. First,
Oklahoma Surety argued that there was no written contract because the
subcontract between Willis and Lyda was never signed by Willis.54 Sec-
ond, Oklahoma Surety argued that the agreement between Willis and
Lyda did not constitute an “insured contract” as defined in the policy.
Regarding the requirement that the agreement be “written,” the Fifth
Circuit rejected Oklahoma Surety’s argument, noting that the policy lan-
guage did not require all parties to sign the subcontract, just that the par-
ties “agree” in a written contract that one of the parties is added as an
additional insured.55 Moreover, the term “written,” according to the Fifth
Circuit, did not impose any requirement that all parties sign the written
agreement.56
Oklahoma Surety’s second argument was that the subcontract did not
constitute a “written ‘insured contract.’” Under the policy, to constitute
an “insured contract,” the contract required Willis to assume the tort lia-
bility of Lyda. The subcontract included an indemnification provision
which, in part, stated: “TO THE FULLEST EXTENT PERMITTED BY
LAW, SUBCONTRACTOR AGREES TO DEFEND, HOLD HARM-
LESS AND UNCONDITIONALLY INDEMNIFY CONTRACTOR
AND OWNER . . . .”57 Willis executed and returned the subcontract to
Lyda with handwritten amendments, striking the portion of the provision
which stated Willis would indemnify Lyda for “ANY NEGLIGENT ACT
OR OMMISSION OR CLAIM INVOLVING STRICT LIABILITY OR
NEGLIGENCE PER SE OF CONTRACTOR OR OWNER [and their
employees].”58
Oklahoma Surety argued that Willis’ handwritten changes to the in-
demnity provision eliminated Willis’ obligation to indemnity Lyda, thus
disqualifying the contract as an “insured” contract. However, the Fifth
Circuit disagreed.59 The Fifth Circuit concluded that “additional insured”
status depended not upon whether Willis actually “assume[d] the tort lia-
bility of another party” in an enforceable indemnity agreement, but
rather on whether Willis “agreed” to assume that tort liability in the sub-
contract.60 Thus, even though the language stricken by the handwritten
notes arguably made the indemnity provision unenforceable, the court
found that the subcontract “still state[d] that Willis agree[d] to ‘uncondi-
tionally indemnify’ [Lyda] ‘to the fullest extent permitted by law’ for ‘all
liability’ that [Lyda] incurs for damages ‘in any manner arising out of or
resulting from [Willis’] performance or failure to perform’ under the sub-
contract.”61 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit found that the subcontract was
54. Id.
55. Id. at 445–46.
56. Id. at 445.
57. Id. at 440.
58. Id. at 441 (strikethrough omitted).
59. Id. at 446.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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a “written ‘insured contract’” as required by the additional insured
provision.62
2. Liability Attributable to Willis’ Work Requirement
Next, the court evaluated whether the allegations in the underlying liti-
gation implicated the scope of coverage under the additional insured pro-
vision.63 The additional insured coverage applied under Willis’ policy
only “‘with respect to liability [Lyda has] directly attributable’ to Willis’
performance of its work for [Lyda].”64 Restricting its analysis of this issue
to the eight corners, the court noted that Willis was identified in the dec-
larations pages of the policy as a “COMMERCIAL ROOFING CON-
TRACTOR.”65 While Willis was not specifically identified in the original
petition, the court explained:
The original petition alleged that [Lyda] was responsible for numer-
ous “material deficiencies” affecting various portions of the project,
including “the roof” and structures on or near the roof. In addition,
the [original] petition alleged that [Lyda] failed to “adequately su-
pervise work performed by subcontractors; to supply sufficient
skilled workers and suitable materials necessary to complete the
[w]ork in accordance with the contract documents; [and] to take ade-
quate protective measures to prevent damage to the [w]ork resulting
from exposure to the elements.” . . . . Reading the original petition
liberally, and resolving any doubts in [Lyda’s] favor, there was at
least a potential that [the underlying] suit fell within the policy’s
scope of coverage. That was sufficient to trigger [Oklahoma Surety’s]
duty to defend under the eight-corners rule. And since [the]
amended petitions contained more factual detail than the original pe-
tition, [Oklahoma Surety] had a duty to defend [Lyda] against them
as well.66
Because the pleading contained allegations that Lyda and its subcontrac-
tors caused property damage, including damage to the roof, and the pol-
icy identified Willis as a commercial roofing contractor, the Fifth Circuit
inferred that the allegations in the pleading of defects in the roof poten-
tially referred to Willis’ work.67 As a result, the Fifth Circuit found that




64. Id. at 447.
65. Id.
66. Id. (emphasis in original).
67. Id. at 448.
68. Id.
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D. FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT HOLDS TENDER OF LIMITS IN
EXCHANGE FOR COVENANT NOT TO EXECUTE AGAINST
INSURED’S ASSETS TERMINATES INSURER’S
DUTY TO DEFEND OBLIGATION
In Aggreko, LLC v. Chartis Specialty Insurance Co., the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Texas evaluated whether an insurer’s
duty to defend terminated upon tender of its limits in exchange for a
covenant not to execute against its insured’s assets by the underlying
plaintiffs.69 In the underlying case, an employee of Guichard Operating
Company (Guichard) died after being “electrocuted when his arm [ ]
touched an electrically-energized generator housing cabinet at a well site”
in Texas.70 In January 2015, suit was filed against multiple entities, includ-
ing Aggreko, LLC (Aggreko), who manufactured the generator housing
cabinet. Aggreko sought coverage for the lawsuit as an additional insured
under the liability policy that Gray Insurance Company (Gray) issued to
Guichard. The policy issued by Gray had limits of $1,000,000 per occur-
rence and stated that Gray’s “‘right and duty to defend ends when [it has]
used up the applicable limit of insurance in the payment of judgments or
settlements . . . .’”71 Gray accepted coverage and agreed to provide Ag-
greko with an unqualified defense in the underlying lawsuit.
In February 2017, Gray reached an agreement with the plaintiffs from
the underlying suit titled “Covenant Not To Execute Agreement” (the
Covenant).72 Pursuant to the Covenant, Gray paid the underlying plain-
tiffs $950,000 for their agreement to provide Aggreko with a covenant not
to execute on any judgment obtained by the underlying plaintiffs. The
Covenant stated, in relevant part, that the underlying plaintiffs
“jointly and severally, promise[d], agree[d,] and covenant[ed] that
they shall not seek to and will not execute on any Judgment obtained
in their favor against Aggreko in the [underlying lawsuit] save and
except to the extent they can recover the Judgment from any insur-
ance company which provides coverage to Aggreko.” The Covenant
. . . further state[d] that the [underlying plaintiffs] “promise[d],
agree[d,] and covenant[ed] that they [would] enforce any and all
such Judgment against the available insurance only, and not against
the assets of Aggreko or its respective present or former directors,
officers, employees, parent companies.”73
Thereafter, Gray notified Aggreko that it was withdrawing its defense
in the underlying lawsuit filed by the decedent’s estate against Aggreko.
Aggreko’s primary insurer, Indian Harbor Insurance Company (Indian
Harbor), sued Gray, asserting, in part, that Gray had an ongoing duty to
defend Aggreko in the underlying lawsuit. Gray argued it had no further
69. Aggreko, LLC v. Chartis Specialty Ins. Co., No. 1:16-CV-297, 2018 WL 4050498, at
*5 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 7, 2018).
70. Id. at *1.
71. Id. (alteration in original).
72. Id. at *2.
73. Id.
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duties to Aggreko because Gray’s policy limits exhausted from the agree-
ments with and payment of a total of $1,000,00074 to the underlying
plaintiffs.75
After determining that the Covenant and Gray’s policy should be con-
strued by Texas law, the district court examined whether the Covenant
constituted a full release or settlement.76 While the Gray policy did not
define the term “settlement,” it did define the term “agreed settlement”
as a “settlement and release of liability, signed by [Gray], the insured, and
the claimant or the claimant’s legal representative.”77 Gray argued that
the Covenant insulated Aggreko’s assets from any risk of judgment by
the decedent’s estate. Relying on U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit78 and state court79 precedent, the district court explained that “al-
though the [decedent’s estate] cannot enforce any judgment directly
against Aggreko’s assets, [the estate] can still assert claims and obtain a
judgment against Aggreko, looking for recovery only from any insurance
carriers that provide coverage to Aggreko.”80 Nevertheless, the district
court found that the Covenant “is sufficient to exhaust Gray’s duty to
defend, despite the fact that not every claim against Aggreko has been
terminated.”81 To support this finding, the district court explained that
the critical question was not whether all potential claims against Aggreko
were extinguished, but instead whether the decedent estate’s claims
against Aggreko’s assets have been fully resolved.82 The district court
noted that the underlying plaintiffs can only execute any judgment ob-
tained against Aggreko by looking to Aggreko’s other insurance policies,
if any.83 Thus, the district court concluded that “by paying its policy limits
and obtaining a covenant not to execute in favor of its insured, an insurer
can fulfill its duty to defend and indemnify without securing a release or
terminating all pending or potential claims against the insured.”84 Ac-
cordingly, the district court found that although there was no express re-
lease of Aggreko, the Covenant coupled with payment of the policy
proceeds exhausted the policy’s limits and extinguished any further duties
owed by Gray to Aggreko.85
74. Id. Gray also entered into a separate agreement with the underlying plaintiffs,
agreeing to pay $50,000 in exchange for a full and final release of another defendant (and
presumably another additional insured under Gray’s policy) in the lawsuit. Id. at *3.
75. Id.
76. Id. at *5–6.
77. Id. at *11 (alteration in original).
78. Id. at *12 (citing Judwin Properties, Inc. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 973 F.2d 432, 436 (5th
Cir. 1992) (per curiam)).
79. Id. at *13 (citing Kings Park Apartments Ltd. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 101
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III. BREACH OF NOTICE CONDITION
A. PLAINTIFF COULD NOT ENFORCE DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST
INSURED WHERE INSURED FAILED TO PROVIDE
NOTICE TO INSURER
In United Automobile Insurance Services v. Rhymes, the Dallas Court
of Appeals evaluated whether an insurer was required to satisfy a default
judgment against its insured when the insured failed to provide notice of
the claim to the insurer.86 Old American Country Mutual Fire Insurance
Company (Old American) issued a personal auto policy through its man-
aging agent United Automobile Insurance Services (UAIS), which pro-
vided coverage to Maria Hernandez (Hernandez). Alvin Rhymes
(Rhymes) was involved in an automobile accident with Hernandez. Prior
to the entry of the default judgment, UAIS attempted without success to
contact Hernandez. During that time, Rhymes’s counsel remained in
communication with UAIS in efforts to settle Rhymes’s claim against
Hernandez. Hernandez, however, failed to contact either USAI or Old
American, and neither requested a defense from UAIS nor submitted suit
papers to UAIS.87
Six months after obtaining the default judgment, Rhymes’s attorney
sent a copy of the judgment to UAIS and demanded payment. Eventu-
ally, Rhymes sued UAIS and Old American to collect on his judgment
against Hernandez. He asserted a breach of contract claim in his status as
a third-party beneficiary of the policy. The trial court ruled that Rhymes
was entitled to coverage under Hernandez’s policy for the judgment.88
On appeal, the issue was whether “[Hernandez’s] complete failure to
give [Old American and UAIS] notice of Rhymes’[s] suit, coupled with
the default judgment against her, defeats Rhymes’[s] claim under the pol-
icy.”89 In holding that Rhymes had no claim under the policy, the appel-
late court noted that an injured person generally “cannot sue the
tortfeasor’s liability insurer directly until the tortfeasor’s liability has been
determined by agreement or judgment.”90 The injured person can only
sue the insurer after judgment because, “[a]s a third-party beneficiary,
Rhymes therefore ‘steps into the shoes’ of [Hernandez] and is bound by
the policy’s conditions precedent.”91
The policy required that Old American “must be notified promptly of
how, when and where the accident or loss happened” and “[n]otice
should also include the names and addresses of any injured persons and
86. United Auto. Ins. Servs. v. Rhymes, No. 05-16-01125-CV, 2018 WL 2077561, at *2
(Tex. App.—Dallas May 4, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
87. Id. at *1.
88. Id. at *2.
89. Id. at *3.
90. Id. (citing Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 244 S.W.3d 885, 888
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied)).
91. Id. (citing Martinez v. ACCC Ins. Co., 343 S.W.3d 924, 929 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2011, no pet.)).
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of any witnesses.”92 Additionally, the policy stated that if the insured’s
“failure to provide notice prejudices [Old American’s] defense, there is
no liability coverage under the policy.”93 The policy also included a provi-
sion requiring that the insured “[p]romptly send [Old American] copies
of any notices or legal papers received in connection with the accident or
loss.”94
Relying on authority from the Texas Supreme Court, the court held
that Old American and UAIS were entitled to summary judgment be-
cause they had conclusively proven that Hernandez did not give notice of
the suit or make a request for a defense in the suit.95 The court also found
that Old American and UAIS proved as a matter of law that they were
prejudiced by the default judgment.96 The court specifically rejected
Rhymes’s argument that Old American and UAIS failed to show
prejudice.97 In support of that argument, Rhymes cited PAJ, Inc. v. Han-
over Insurance Co.,98 in which “the supreme court held that the insured’s
failure to timely notify the insurer of a claim or suit does not defeat cov-
erage if the delay did not prejudice the insurer.”99 The court found that
PAJ was inapplicable because “(i) PAJ involved late notice while this
case involves a complete lack of notice and (ii) the parties in that case
stipulated that there was no resulting prejudice.”100
Moreover, the court rejected Rhymes’s argument that notice provided
by his attorney was sufficient to satisfy the notice requirement of the Her-
nandez policy.101 Citing National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Crocker,102
the court held that it is “clear that the insurer’s duties are triggered when
the insured gives notice and requests a defense,” but that “[n]otice given
by a third party does not trigger the insurer’s duty to defend and does not
estop the insurer from asserting the insured’s breach as a bar to
liability.”103
Thus, the court found that the notice provided by Rhymes’s own coun-
sel was “irrelevant.”104 Furthermore, the court found that “[t]he default




95. Id. at *5.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 243 S.W.3d 630, 636–37 (Tex. 2008).
99. Rhymes, 2018 WL 2077561, at *5.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 246 S.W.3d 603, 608–09 (Tex. 2008).
103. Rhymes, 2018 WL 2077561, at *6 (emphasis in original) (citing Crocker, 246
S.W.3d at 608 (“Mere awareness of a claim or suit does not impose a duty on the insurer to
defend under the policy . . . .”)); see also Crocker, 246 S.W.3d at 608 (stating insurer does
not have to “gratuitously subject[ ] itself to liability” before insured gives notice of suit);
Hoel v. Old Am. County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 01-16-00610-CV, 2017 WL 3911020 at *1,
*3–5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st. Dist] Sept. 7, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating insured did
not give notice of suit, even though injured party gave insurer several notices about suit)).
104. Rhymes, 2018 WL 2077561, at *5.
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nity to litigate the claim’s merits but also imposed ‘a new burden of proof
on new issues’ in order to set the default judgment aside.”105 Thus, the
court held that the default was prejudicial as a matter of law. This holding
is significant in that the court found that the entry of a default judgment
against an insured constitutes prejudice as a matter of law, even if the
default judgment is still susceptible to being set aside. In other words, the
fact that a judgment might ultimately be set aside on a motion for new
trial does not eliminate the prejudice to the insurer, because the entry of
the default judgment imposed “a new burden of proof on new issues”
required to overturn the judgment.106
IV. LANDSCAPE OF EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY
POST MENCHACA
As noted in the authors’ article last year, insurers previously argued
“that an insured is prohibited from recovering extra-contractual damages
under Chapter 541 of the Texas Insurance Code (Chapter 541) absent the
insured demonstrating it sustained an ‘independent injury’ separate and
apart from the loss of the policy benefits.”107 The Texas Supreme Court
rejected a “broad ‘independent injury’ prerequisite to bringing a claim
under Chapter 541” in USAA Texas Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca and, “in an
attempt to clarify years of what it admitt[ed] was confusing precedent, the
supreme court promulgated five rules for evaluating when an insured can
recover statutory extra-contractual damages from an insurer.”108 In the
wake of the Menchaca opinion, courts have begun evaluating how those
rules should be applied. The rules outlined by Menchaca are as follows:
First, as a general rule, an insured cannot recover policy benefits as
damages for an insurer’s statutory violation if the policy does not
provide the insured a right to receive those benefits. Second, an in-
sured who establishes a right to receive benefits under the insurance
policy can recover those benefits as actual damages under the Insur-
ance Code if the insurer’s statutory violation causes the loss of the
benefits. Third, even if the insured cannot establish a present con-
tractual right to policy benefits, the insured can recover benefits as
actual damages under the Insurance Code if the insurer’s statutory
violation caused the insured to lose that contractual right. Fourth, if
an insurer’s statutory violation causes an injury independent of the
loss of policy benefits, the insured may recover damages for that in-
jury even if the policy does not grant the insured a right to benefits.
And fifth, an insured cannot recover any damages based on an in-
surer’s statutory violation if the insured had no right to receive bene-
fits under the policy and sustained no injury independent of a right to
105. Id. at *6 (quoting Hoel, 2017 WL 3911020, at *5).
106. See id. at *4; see also Coastal Ref. & Mktg., Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co., 218
S.W.3d 279, 287–88 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (discussing the
prejudicial effect of a default judgment against an insured creates upon the insurer).
107. J. Price Collins et al., Insurance Law, 4 SMU ANN. TEX. SURV. 217, 220 (2018).
108. Id. (citing USAA Tex. Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d 479, 484 (Tex. 2018)).
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benefits.109
During the Survey period, several opinions were issued that illustrate
how courts have applied the Menchaca rules under various factual scena-
rios. The authors discuss a few of these examples below.
A. FIFTH CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT DEFENSE COSTS OWED TO AN
ADDITIONAL INSURED ARE RECOVERABLE UNDER
CHAPTER 541, PURSUANT TO THE
ENTITLED-TO-BENEFITS RULE
In Lyda Swinerton v. Oklahoma Surety Co., the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit addressed two of the rules outlined in Menchaca.110
As noted above, the case involved analysis of whether Oklahoma Surety
wrongfully refused to defend Lyda as an additional insured in an underly-
ing lawsuit. Lyda sued Oklahoma Surety for breach of contract, and also
for violations of Chapter 541 of the Insurance Code. Although the district
court found that Oklahoma Surety breached its contract by refusing to
defend Lyda, the district court determined that Lyda was not entitled to
recovery under Chapter 541 because Lyda failed to establish that it sus-
tained an injury independent of the injuries it sought under the insurance
contract.111
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit recognized that at the time the district
court rendered its opinion the Texas Supreme Court had not yet issued its
holding in Menchaca.112 In light of the rules outlined in that opinion, the
Fifth Circuit concluded that the “independent-injury” rule did not pre-
clude Lyda’s statutory claim under Chapter 541.113 The Fifth Circuit rec-
ognized that the Texas supreme court had found that there are actually
two aspects of the independent-injury rule:
The first is that, if an insurer’s statutory violation causes an injury
independent of the insured’s right to recover policy benefits, the in-
sured may recover damages for that injury even if the policy does not
entitle the insured to receive benefits . . . . The second aspect of the
independent-injury rule is that an insurer’s statutory violation does
not permit the insured to recover any damages beyond policy bene-
fits unless the violation causes an injury that is independent from the
loss of the benefits.114
The Fifth Circuit stated that the phrase “beyond policy benefits” indi-
cates that the “independent-injury rule does not restrict the damages an
insured can recover under the entitled-to-benefits rule” but instead “lim-
its the recovery of other damages that ‘flow’ or ‘stem’ from a mere denial
109. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d at 489 (emphasis in original).
110. Lyda Swinerton Builders, Inc. v. Okla. Sur. Co., 903 F.3d 435, 451–52 (5th Cir.
2018).
111. Id. at 451, 453.
112. Id. at 451.
113. Id. at 453.
114. Id. at 452 (quoting Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d at 499–500) (emphasis in original).
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of policy benefits,” such as emotional distress.115 As a result, the Fifth
Circuit found that because Lyda established that it was entitled to a de-
fense from Oklahoma Surety, the defense was a benefit owed to Lyda
under the policy.116 Thus, if Lyda was able to establish on remand that
Oklahoma Surety’s “alleged misrepresentations caused it to be deprived
of that benefit, [Lyda] can recover the resulting defense costs it incurred
as actual damages under Chapter 541—without limitation from the inde-
pendent-injury rule. Furthermore, if [Lyda] proves that [Oklahoma
Surety] committed the statutory violation ‘knowingly,’ it may recover
treble that amount.”117
In short, the Fifth Circuit found that if Lyda can show that Oklahoma
Surety committed a violation of Chapter 541 in refusing to provide a de-
fense to Lyda, the damages resulting from that breach can be recoverable
under Chapter 541.118 Significantly, the mere breach of the contractual
duty to defend is not sufficient to constitute a violation of Chapter 541.119
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for
further proceedings in order to determine whether Oklahoma Surety vio-
lated Chapter 541 by refusing to defend Lyda.120
B. TEXAS APPELLATE COURT HOLDS THAT BONA FIDE COVERAGE
DISPUTE DOES NOT PROVIDE BASIS FOR EXTRA-
CONTRACTUAL DAMAGES
In State Farm Lloyds v. Webb, the Beaumont Court of Appeals evalu-
ated whether the evidence presented by an insured was sufficient to sup-
port a finding that the insurer violated Chapter 541.121 The matter
involved a coverage dispute between State Farm Lloyds (State Farm) and
its insured David Webb (Webb) over the scope and amount of covered
damages resulting from a plumbing leak at Webb’s home.122 The jury
found that State Farm breached the contract and knowingly violated
Chapter 541. The jury awarded Webb contract damages of $15,000. Sepa-
rately, the jury awarded $20,000 in actual damages for violations of Chap-
ter 541 and $60,000 in additional damages based on their finding that
State Farm’s statutory violations were committed knowingly.123 The jury
found that State Farm (1) failed to settle the claim once liability had be-
come reasonably clear; and (2) failed to conduct a reasonable
investigation.124
115. Id. (quoting Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d at 500) (emphasis in original).
116. Id. at 453.
117. Id. (noting that the Texas Insurance Code “provides for the trebling of ‘actual




121. See State Farm Lloyds v. Webb, No. 09-15-00408-CV, 2017 WL 1739763, at *1 (Tex.
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On appeal, State Farm argued that the evidence was legally and factu-
ally insufficient to support the jury’s findings that State Farm had com-
mitted an insurance code violation. The appellate court agreed with State
Farm.125 Beginning its analysis, the court noted:
In determining whether the insurer had a reasonable basis to deny a
claim, we review the facts available to the insurer at the time of the
denial. Evidence that merely shows a bona fide dispute about the
insurer’s liability on the contract does not rise to the level of bad
faith. Thus, a disagreement among experts concerning whether the
cause of the loss is covered by the policy will not support a judgment
for bad faith.126
Guided by the above principles, the court declined to find that State Farm
acted in bad faith when its denial of Webb’s claim was grounded upon
reasonable reliance on its expert’s report.127 The court reasoned that dis-
agreement among the experts on their findings coupled with the fact that
liability on Webb’s claim was unclear, provided a reasonable basis for
State Farm to deny the claim. Accordingly, the court concluded that
neither a bona fide dispute about State Farm’s liability on the contract
nor evidence that it was incorrect about the factual basis for its denial of
the claim can be evidence of bad faith.128
Therefore, with respect to the $15,000 that the jury determined repre-
sented the benefits Webb was due under the policy, the court determined
State Farm’s failure to pay those benefits was not the result of an insur-
ance code violation, even if it constituted a breach of contract.129 In other
words, Webb was not entitled to recovery under the entitled-to-benefits
rule of Menchaca. Therefore, in order for the jury’s $20,000 award to
stand, these damages would have to be recoverable under the indepen-
dent-injury rule. However, Webb “failed to produce evidence of an injury
independent of the denial of insurance policy benefits.”130 Accordingly,
the court held that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the
jury’s award of damages under Chapter 541.131
C. FIFTH CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT INSURED’S CLAIM UNDER THE
MENCHACA INDEPENDENT INJURY RULE COULD NOT
INCLUDE DAMAGES THAT STEM
FROM POLICY BENEFITS
In Moore v. Allstate Texas Lloyds, Glen Moore (Moore) sued Allstate
Texas Lloyds (Allstate) for breach of contract and violations of the Insur-
ance Code.132 The district court found “that [the insured] failed to plead
125. Id. at *9.
126. Id. at *8.




131. Id. at *10.
132. Moore v. Allstate Tex. Lloyds, 742 F. App’x 815, 817 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam).
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sufficient facts to state a viable breach of contract claim,” and dismissed
that claim.133 Additionally, the district court dismissed the insured’s “ex-
tra-contractual claims, stating ‘[t]here can be no recovery for extra-con-
tractual damages for mishandling claims unless the complained of acts or
omissions caused an injury independent of those that would have resulted
from a wrongful denial of policy benefits.’”134
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
district court’s dismissal of the breach of contract claim. With respect to
the dismissal of his extra-contractual claims, Moore argued that he had
pleaded sufficient facts to state violations of the insurance code. He fur-
ther argued that, under Menchaca, he was entitled to recovery if “viola-
tions cause an injury that is independent from breach of contract . . . even
if the [contract] does not provide benefits.”135
The court recognized that Moore was relying on the fourth rule (i.e.,
the independent-injury rule) from Menchaca: “ ‘if an insurer’s statutory
violation causes an injury independent of the loss of policy benefits, the
insured may recover damages for that injury even if the policy does not
grant the insured a right to benefits.’”136 In rejecting this position, the
court stated the following:
[The insured] . . . omits the [supreme] court’s explanation that this
independent-injury rule applies “only if the damages are truly inde-
pendent of the insured’s right to receive policy benefits.” That is, the
independent-injury rule “does not apply if the insured’s statutory or
extra-contractual claims ‘are predicated on [the loss] being covered
under the insurance policy’ . . . or if the damages ‘flow’ or ‘stem’
from the denial of the claim for policy benefits.” The [supreme] court
further explained that “[w]hen an insured seeks to recover damages
that ‘are predicated on,’ ‘flow from,’ or ‘stem from’ policy benefits,
the general rule applies and precludes recovery unless the policy en-
titles the insured to those benefits.”137
Finding that the bad faith claims were predicated on his loss being cov-
ered by his contract, the Fifth Circuit held that the independent-injury
rule did not apply.138 Instead, Moore’s claims were governed by the gen-
eral rule: “an insured cannot recover policy benefits as damages for an
insurer’s statutory violation if the policy does not provide the insured a
right to receive those benefits.”139 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s dismissal of Moore’s extra-contractual claims.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 818.
135. Id. at 818–19.
136. Id. at 819 (quoting USAA Tex. Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d 479, 489 (Tex.
2018)).
137. Id. (citations omitted).
138. See id.
139. Id. (quoting Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d at 489).
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V. APPRAISAL AND LOSS PAYMENT
A. FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT AND STATE APPELLATE COURT HOLD
THAT PROMPT PAYMENT OF APPRAISAL AWARD PRECLUDE
INSUREDS’ EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL CLAIMS
In Kezar v. State Farm Lloyds, Thomas G. and Sylva Shroyer Kezar
(the Kezars) filed a claim under their homeowners’ policy issued by State
Farm Lloyds (State Farm) after their home was damaged by a fire.140 The
parties could not agree on the scope of damages owed under the policy,
so State Farm invoked the policy’s appraisal clause. Following the ap-
praisal process, State Farm paid the appraisal award amount. Neverthe-
less, the Kezars alleged that although State Farm paid the claim, it was in
breach of contract because it did not pay the claim in a timely manner.
The Kezars also alleged fraud, negligence, breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing, and unfair settlement practices.141
With respect to the contract claim, the U.S. District Court for the West-
ern District of Texas evaluated whether the payment by State Farm, after
the appraisal award, was timely.142 The disagreement centered on what
event actually triggered State Farm’s contractual obligation to pay the
Kezars within five business days.143 The relevant “Loss Payment” provi-
sion in the policy stated:
If we notify you that we will pay your claim, or part of your claims,
we must pay within 5 business days after we notify you. If payment
of your claim or part of your claim requires the performance of an
act by you, we must pay within 5 business days after the date you
perform the act.144
The district court held that the unambiguous language required “payment
within five business days only if State Farm notifies the Kezars that it will
pay some or all of a claim—or, if payment is conditioned on some action
by the Kezars, five days from that action.”145 Because the Kezars did not
dispute that State Farm made payment within five days of notifying the
Kezars that the claim would be paid, the district court found that State
Farm had not breached the contract.146
In support of their cause of action for breach of the duty of good faith
and fair dealing, the Kezars “allege[d] that State Farm had no reasonable
basis for denying or delaying payment of their claim.”147 The district
court noted that under Texas law, an insurer owes its insured the duty of
good faith and fair dealing and breaches such duty “‘if the insurer knew
140. Kezar v. State Farm Lloyds, No. 1:17-CV-389-RP, 2018 WL 2271380, at *1 (W.D.
Tex. May 17, 2018).
141. Id. at *1.
142. Id. at *2.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at *3.
146. Id.
147. Id. at *4.
2019] Insurance Law 201
or should have known that it was reasonably clear that the claim was
covered,’ but denies or unreasonably delays payment of the claim.”148 To
prevail on a bad faith claim, the insured must “‘first show[ ] that the in-
surer breached the contract.’”149 However, citing Menchaca, the district
court noted that there are several exceptions to this rule, for example, “if
the insurer [were to] commit some act, so extreme, that would cause in-
jury independent of the policy claim.”150
“State Farm argue[d] that no exception to the general rule applies and
that it is therefore not liable in tort because it did not breach its contract
with the Kezars.”151 According to State Farm, the Kezars “failed to al-
lege[ ] any facts which would give rise to an independent injury claim.”152
However, the Kezars argued that “State Farm’s intentional delay in set-
tling their claims [through appraisal] caused them injuries independent of
the policy claim.”153 The district court summarized the Kezars’ further
contention as follows:
Specifically, the Kezars identify three acts of allegedly intentional de-
lay: (1) State Farm’s agent initially estimated the loss at a value ap-
proximately $200,000 lower than the ultimate appraisal award; (2)
State Farm appointed its appraiser 28 days late; and (3) State Farm’s
appraiser took seven months to submit his estimate. The Kezars state
that these delays injured them by increasing their construction costs,
diminishing their health and quality of life, requiring them to spend
money to convert their office into a residential space, and delaying
their claim to their appraisal award.154
The district court found that these alleged instances of delay were
neither sufficiently independent nor sufficiently extreme to trigger the in-
dependent-injury rule.155 Reiterating the foundation of the independent-
injury rule set out by the Menchaca court, the court restated that “[t]he
independent-injury applies ‘only if the damages are truly independent of
the insured’s right to receive policy benefits.’”156 Accordingly, any al-
leged extra-contractual claims cannot be “predicated on the loss being
covered under the insurance policy” and the damages cannot “‘flow or
stem’ from the denial of the claim.”157 In interpreting the substance of
the injuries contained in the Kezars’ own allegations, the district court
found that each alleged injury was “caused by State Farm’s allegedly bad-
faith delays in fully resolving their claim.”158 The district court found that
148. Id. (quoting Garcia v. Lloyds, 514 S.W.3d 257, 276 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016,
pet. denied)).
149. Id.
150. Id. (quoting USAA Tex. Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d 479, 499 (Tex. 2018))
(alteration in original).
151. Id.
152. Id. (alteration in original).
153. Id.




158. Id. at *5.
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these “injuries flow from the denial of the Kezars’ claim” and therefore
the independent-injury rule did not apply.159 Accordingly, the court held
that the Kezars’ “recovery for this extra-contractual cause of action is
barred by their failure to establish a breach of contract.”160
In Turner v. Peerless Indemnity Insurance Co., William Turner (Turner)
sued Peerless Indemnity Insurance Company (Peerless) for breach of
contract and extra-contractual damages resulting from a dispute over cov-
erage under a homeowners’ insurance policy.161 Following Turner’s
tender of the claim, Peerless and Turner could not agree as to the amount
of the loss. Following suit by Turner, Peerless invoked the appraisal
clause, subsequently paid the amount of the appraisal award, and moved
for summary judgment on Turner’s contract and extra-contractual
claims.162 The trial court granted Peerless’s motion.
The Amarillo Court of Appeals next considered the extra-contractual
claims after first determining that the trial court’s judgment on the breach
of contract claims was supported by the evidence.163 Peerless argued that
Turner provided no evidence of the requisite independent injury in sup-
port of those claims.164 In other words, Peerless argued, “[Turner] had no
evidence of suffering damages aside from those represented by suppos-
edly lost policy benefits.”165 To rebut this contention, Turner posited that
the lost benefits provide sufficient evidence of an independent injury.166
The court, however, disagreed with Turner’s position.167
Citing Menchaca, the court declared that “[t]he independent injury rule
is alive and well.”168 Recall that an insured’s cause of action for extra-
contractual damages pursuant to the independent injury rule holds that
extra-contractual liability “is ‘distinct’ from its liability for benefits under
the insurance policy.”169 The court then reiterated the “two aspects” of
the independent injury rule established by the Texas Supreme Court in
Menchaca.170 First, “an insurer’s statutory violation causes an injury inde-
pendent of the insured’s right to recover policy benefits, the insured may
recover damages for that injury even if the policy does not entitle the
insured to receive benefits.”171 Second, “an insured can recover actual
damages caused by the insurer’s bad-faith conduct if the damages ‘are
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Turner v. Peerless Indem. Ins. Co., No. 07-17-00279-CV, 2018 WL 2709489, at *1
(Tex. App.—Amarillo Jun. 5, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
162. Id.
163. Id. at *3.





169. Id. (quoting USAA Tex. Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d 479, 499 (Tex.
2018)).
170. Id.
171. Id. (quoting Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d at 499).
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separate from and . . . differ from benefits under the contract.’”172
With respect to the second aspect, the supreme court has explained
that an insured may only recover damages if the statutory violation
causes an independent injury that is separate from the loss of benefits.173
The court interpreted the Menchaca decision to “have particular applica-
tion to situations where a claim falls outside the coverage provided by the
insurance policy and the insured nonetheless sues for damages.”174 The
court opined that some admittedly rare situations may arise where an
insured may recover “damages unrelated to the supposed policy bene-
fits.”175 However, the court noted that this was not such a situation be-
cause “there was coverage and full payment was made timely once the
parties completed the appraisal process as established by the insurance
policy.”176
Here, the court found that Turner received the benefit that was af-
forded under the insurance policy.177 However, the court noted that
Menchaca seems to indicate that in rare circumstances, extra-contractual
damages may be available to the insured despite the lack of a breach of
contract.178 In such situations, the extra-contractual claim must not be
“predicated on [the loss] being covered under the insurance policy.”179
The court surmised that “[t]his suggests that when benefits are paid per
the contract and the insurer performed its contractual obligation (i.e., has
not breached the contract), an insured may still pursue extra-contractual
causes of action but only when they are not founded upon the loss or
injury allegedly covered by the policy.”180 In other words, the extra-con-
tractual claims must be based “on an act that caused injury independent
of the policy claim.”181
The court held that Turner’s extra-contractual claims were not based
on an act that caused him an independent injury of the policy claim.182
Moreover, the court noted that Turner did not even make such an argu-
ment; rather, he posited that if his claim was covered, then Peerless was
bound by its statutory duties.183 Turner further proposed that if Peerless
breached its duties, then the resulting lost benefits are transformed into
“legal damage,” which is not recoverable under the policy but is recover-
172. Id. (quoting Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d at 499).






179. Id. (alteration in original); see also USAA Tex. Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, 545
S.W.3d 479, 500 (Tex. 2018) (stating that the independent-injury rule “does not apply if the
insured’s statutory or extra-contractual claims ‘are predicated on [the loss] being covered
under the insurance policy’ . . . or if the damages ‘flow’ or ‘stem’ from the denial of the
claim for policy benefits”).
180. Turner, 2018 WL 2709489, at *4.
181. Id.
182. See id. at *4–5.
183. Id. at *5.
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able pursuant to the bad faith statute.184 However, applying its “percep-
tion” of the independent-injury rule as explained in Menchaca, the court
determined that Turner’s injury cannot be predicated on his theory of
“legal damage.”185 Instead, the court found that Turner’s injury must “be
independent of what he claims he lost ‘out on’ under the policy.”186
Therefore, the court concluded that it must overrule Turner’s issue and
affirmed the summary judgment.187
B. STATE APPELLATE COURT HOLDS THAT TIMELY PAYMENT OF
APPRAISAL AWARD PRECLUDES PROMPT PAYMENT ACT
CLAIMS UNDER CHAPTER 542 OF THE
TEXAS INSURANCE CODE
In Marchbanks v. Liberty Insurance Corp., the Fourteenth Houston
Court of Appeals evaluated whether timely payment of an appraisal
award precluded claims against an insurer under Chapter 542 of the Texas
Insurance Code (the Prompt Payment Act).188 The insured’s residence
purportedly sustained hail damage, prompting the insured to submit a
claim to his insurer, Liberty Insurance Corporation (Liberty). Following
multiple inspections, Liberty determined that the only covered damage
was for an amount below the deductible and advised that it would not be
issuing payment. The insured filed suit and Liberty invoked the appraisal
provision in its policy. Liberty then paid the appraisal award to the
insured.
Following payment of the appraisal award, Liberty moved for summary
judgment against the insured on his claims, including his claims that Lib-
erty violated the Prompt Payment Act. In response, the insured “con-
tended that Liberty violated two sections of the Prompt Payment . . . Act
before Liberty invoked appraisal” because it failed “to request items,
statements, and forms that it reasonably believed were required,” and
failed “to accept or reject [the insured’s] claim within 15 business days of
receiving all items, statements, and forms required.”189 The focus of the
insured’s claims was on the pre-appraisal conduct of Liberty. Rejecting
the insured’s argument, the court held that “full and timely payment of
the amount owed under the policy based on an appraisal award precludes





188. Marchbanks v. Liberty Ins. Corp., 558 S.W.3d 308, 310 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2018, pet. filed). The relevant provision in the Prompt Payment Act states:
If an insurer that is liable for a claim under an insurance policy is not in
compliance with this subchapter [the Prompt Payment of Claims Act], the
insurer is liable to pay the holder of the policy or the beneficiary making the
claim under the policy, in addition to the amount of the claim, interest on the
amount of the claim at the rate of 18 percent a year as damages, together
with reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees.
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 542.060(a).
189. Marchbanks, 558 S.W.3d at 311.
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Act].”190 The court also declined to recognize that, according to the in-
sured, the rationale for the Prompt Payment Act is to impose a penalty
upon an insurer that breaches its contract by not making timely payment
of covered claims.191 If the insured cannot establish that the insurer
breached any provision of the policy, there is no basis for imposing an
extra-contractual penalty.192 The “appraisal award does not resolve
whether the insurer is liable under the insurance policy”; rather, the ap-
praisal simply states the amount of the loss.193 Thus, if an insurer pays the
full amount of the appraisal, there is no breach and no basis to impose the
statutory penalty.194
VI. UNDERINSURED/UNINSURED MOTORIST LIABILITY—
COURT OF APPEALS FINDS TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN FAILING TO ABATE EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL
CLAIMS PENDING RESOLUTION OF CONTRACT
CLAIM FOR UIM COVERAGE
In In re State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the plaintiffs
“were involved in an automobile accident” allegedly “caused by the neg-
ligence of [another] driver.”195 After the accident, the negligent driver’s
insurer “tendered the full per person liability policy limit” to each plain-
tiff.196 The plaintiffs subsequently filed a claim for uninsured motorist
benefits with their insurer State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company (State Farm). After State Farm allegedly failed to respond to
their demand, the plaintiffs filed suit against State Farm and its two ad-
justers, alleging causes of action for breach of contract and extra-contrac-
tual claims for violations of the Texas Insurance Code.197 The trial court
severed the plaintiffs’ extra-contractual claims from the contract claims,
but did not abate the extra-contractual claims pending resolution of the
breach of contract claims. State Farm and its two adjusters thereafter filed
a petition for mandamus relief and asserted that “State Farm is under no
contractual [obligation] to pay underinsured motorist (‘UIM’) benefits”
until the plaintiffs obtain a judgment establishing the breach of contract
claims.198
In Brainard v. Trinity Universal Insurance Co., the Texas Supreme
Court held that under the Texas Insurance Code, “the UIM insurer is
under no contractual duty to pay benefits until the insured obtains a judg-
ment establishing the liability and underinsured status of the other mo-
190. Id. at 312.
191. Id. at 315.
192. Id. at 313.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 313–14.
195. In re State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 553 S.W.3d 557, 559 (Tex. App.—San
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torist.”199 Because State Farm’s contractual liability had not yet been
determined, State Farm argued that the extra-contractual claims should
have been abated. However, the plaintiffs argued that Menchaca “nulli-
fied the need for abatement in cases involving first-party claims because
breach of contract claims and extra-contractual claims are separate causes
of action that exist independent of each other.”200 The plaintiffs con-
tended that, post-Menchaca, an insured is not required to rely on a
breach-of-contract finding to pursue statutory violation claims.201 Addi-
tionally, plaintiffs posited a public policy argument that Menchaca shifts
the “long-standing pattern of inequitable outcomes favoring insurers
under Brainard.”202
The San Antonio Court of Appeals, however, disagreed and “[ob-
served that] the plaintiffs read Manchaca [sic] too broadly.”203 Notably,
the court noted that Menchaca neither overrules Brainard nor mentions
Brainard.204 Because the Texas supreme court did not overrule its deci-
sion in Brainard, the court reasoned that it is bound by the applicable
precedent.205 Additionally, the court noted that Menchaca neither in-
volved a UIM claim nor addressed “whether contract and extra-contrac-
tual claims should be severed and abated.”206 The court then
distinguished Menchaca from Brainard, noting that “Menchaca stated
that a breach of contract claim is ‘distinct and independent’ from extra-
contractual claims, while Brainard set forth the test an insured must sat-
isfy before pursuing extra-contractual claims in an UIM case.”207 The
court further elaborated that the holdings in Menchaca and Brainard are
consistent with each other and there is no indication that “Menchaca nul-
lified Brainard’s holding that a ‘UIM contract is unique because, accord-
ing to its terms, benefits are conditioned upon the insured’s legal
entitlement to receive damages from a third party.’”208 Moreover, the
court highlighted that Menchaca “ ‘clarifi[ed] and affirm[ed]’ the general
rule that an insured cannot recover policy benefits as actual damages for
199. Id. (quoting Brainard v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 216 S.W.3d 809, 818 (Tex.
2006)).
200. Id. at 560.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 561.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. (noting that “[i]t is the prerogative of the Texas Supreme Court to overrule its
own decisions and, until it expressly does so, we are bound by the caselaw that directly
applies”).
206. Id. (noting “[i]nstead, [Menchaca] involved a first-party claim by the insured
against her insurer for storm damage to the insured’s home”).
207. Id. at 562 (noting that in Menchaca, the Texas Supreme Court noted “An insured’s
claim for breach of an insurance contract is ‘distinct’ and ‘independent’ from claims that
the insurer violated its extra-contractual common-law and statutory duties. . . . A claim for
breach of the policy is a ‘contract cause of action,’ while a common-law or statutory bad-
faith claim ‘is a cause of action that sounds in tort.’ But the claims are often ‘largely inter-
woven,’ and the same evidence is often ‘admissible on both claims.’”).
208. Id. (quoting Brainard v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 216 S.W.3d 809, 818 (Tex.
2006)) (emphasis in original).
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an insurer’s statutory violation if the insured has no right to those bene-
fits under the policy.”209 The court reconciled this notion with the distinc-
tion discussed in Brainard between first-party insurance contract claims
and UIM contracts, which held that “the insurer’s contractual obligation
to pay benefits does not arise until liability and damages are deter-
mined.”210 As such, the court explained that the holdings in Menchaca
and Brainard were consistent.211 Ultimately, the court concluded that
“Menchaca’s ‘distinct and independent’ holding does not inevitably lead
to the conclusion that abatement of extra-contractual claims is no longer
required in a UIM case when the UIM claim is disputed.”212
The court observed that, “because of their unique nature, UIM extra-
contractual claims can be rendered moot if the insured does not obtain a
judgment against the underinsured motorist.”213 Accordingly, the court
held that “abatement is necessary to avoid litigation expense and con-
serve judicial resources.”214
209. Id. (quoting USAA Tex. Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d 479, 495 (Tex.
2018)).
210. Id. (quoting Brainard, 216 S.W.3d at 818).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 564.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 564–65.
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